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ABSTRACT: 
 
Participatory Budgeting has by now been widely discussed, and often celebrated, now 
instituted in at least 1,500 cities worldwide.  Some of its central features - its structure 
of open meetings, its yearly cycle, and its combination of deliberation and 
representation are by now well-known.  In this paper, however, we critically reflect on 
its global travel and argue for more careful consideration of some of its less well-known 
features, namely, the coupling of the budgeting meetings with the exercise of power.  
We disaggregate PB into its communicative and empowerment dimensions and argue 
that its empowerment dimensions have usually not been part of its global expansion and 
this is cause for concern from the point of view of emancipation.   In this paper we thus 
discuss the specific institutional reforms associated with empowerment in the original 
version as well as its analytic dimensions.   We also address some of the specific 
dangers of a communication-only version of PB as well as some suggestions for 
reintroducing empowerment.     
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Introduction 
Of all the Real Utopia proposals, Participatory Budgeting has a unique status: not only 
is it an institutional reform that has been widely implemented (1500 cities as of last 
count), it is one whose original design is self-consciously aimed at the kind of social 
transformation that undergirds Real Utopian thinking.  That is, in contrast to community 
policing, public libraries, or Wikipedia, the original design objectives of Participatory 
Budgeting were not just better policing or a more transparent society but bringing to life 
practices that were both pre-figurative of the societies we want and part of a strategy of 
achieving that society (in one version, a “virus” to infiltrate the bourgeois state).  Much 
of the hand-wringing about Participatory Budgeting has been about whether it has 
indeed brought us closer to that.  And the reflections about Participatory Budgeting 
have developed alongside Real Utopian thinking, often having it as a central point of 
reference.
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  As Participatory Budgeting has finally arrived on US shores (Chicago, New 
York, and Vallejo) it completes a twenty-five year journey from social movements and 
leftist parties in Brazil during the end of its military dictatorship to the heart of Empire, 
via a number of international networks and agencies.  Participatory Budgeting provides 
us with an unusually clear vantage point from which to explore the real world 
possibilities of Real Utopian thinking. 
The global travel and adoption of Participatory Budgeting is a remarkable story.  A 
relatively simple idea – that “ordinary citizens” should have a direct say in public 
budgets that impact them, it has traveled the world by the most unexpected routes and 
landed in unlikely sites. Some twenty-odd years after its shaky start in under the leftist 
city government of the Workers’ Party (PT) of Porto Alegre3, and twenty-five after its 
first mention by neighborhood activists in that city, the idea and basic blueprint of 
Participatory Budgeting have now circled the world, having been implemented in 
literally hundreds of cities in all continents.   First it circulated through Workers’ Party 
networks in the 1990s reaching throughout Brazil, before becoming popular throughout 
Latin America, via political party networks and then NGOs. Hundreds of municipal 
participatory budgets were developed in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere in the region. In the 
2000s, participatory budgeting then attracted the attention of international development 
agencies as well as that of activists in the Global North who learned about it through the 
World Social Forum.   Since 2000, the World Bank and United Nations agencies have 
in one way or another helped bring participatory budgeting to Asia and Africa, in 
countries such as Turkey, Fiji, Senegal, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.  And at the same 
time, European cities begun to implement this idea, once described as the “return of the 
Caravels” by Giovanni Allegretti and Carsten Herzberg4.  At the time of this writing 
there are dozens of experiences in countries like Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, 
Germany, England, and Albania
5
.  It has, along the way, become official government 
policy in Venezuela, Peru, and the Dominican Republic, and most recently, actively 
promoted by subsequent Labor governments in Britain.  It has by now even appeared in 
the United States, starting with Chicago’s 49th Ward in 2009.  
There are several striking features to this journey, but we begin this essay by focusing 
on one: the seemingly endless adaptability of PB to the most varied contexts and its 
compatibility with the most diverse political projects: Left, Right and Center.  As the 
idea traveled from the South of Brazil to other places within Latin America in the 
1990s, it slowly but surely gained acceptance by political parties outside of the left.   As 
it traveled internationally, it became completely dissociated from progressive parties 
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altogether.  By the time it arrived in the United States there were still invocations of 
social justice by some of its implementers, but it was de-linked from progressive 
institutional projects and was part instead of the loose toolkit of ideas for innovative 
good governance, part of the “fast policy transfer” that Jamie Peck has described as 
characteristic of our era.
6
 
In the 2000s, PB had become completely politically polyvalent.   It was promoted by 
actors as varied as the World Bank and the Chavez government in Venezuela.   The PB 
Unit, a promoting organization in England, in one of its “how-to” pages, describes how 
to make a pitch for PB to your local elected official, instructing advocates to choose 
from a menu of arguments to make for it based on the councilor’s political leanings. 
Greens and progressives might find resonance in PB’s local empowerment, but centrists 
and conservatives do so as well: as it should be framed as a  “sensible step in 
decentralising and localising responsibility.”  For conservatives, PB is to be promoted 
as fostering “community cohesion,” “innovation,” “social entrepreneurship” and 
“restoring trust” in government.7 
The argument we make in this essay is that Participatory Budgeting, in its original 
versions as part of a transformative left project, was but one part of a broader set of 
institutional reforms.  In addition to open meetings where citizens decided on priorities 
(the more visible part of PB), there was a much-less visible but crucially important 
institutional architecture that created the conditions for those decisions to be meaningful 
by linking them to the centers of governmental decision-making.  These real democratic 
reforms of the state apparatus were manifold, and included, among others, reforms to 
subordinate the local bureaucracy to citizen demands and to protect the “chain of 
popular sovereignty” from outside influence by creating a cabinet-level special 
department above fiefdom-like municipal departments through which all PB projects 
would be approved.  The combination of the open meetings with these reforms made PB 
participation come closer and closer to effective popular control of the local state.  In 
fact, a recurrent problem noted in the literature with the early PB experiments was that 
elected city councilors often opposed the process for feeling sidelined altogether. 
We describe these two elements as the communicative and empowerment dimensions of 
PB.   We refer to the open structure of transparent meetings to decide on projects and 
priorities as the communicative dimension because the meetings are based on 
procedures that regulate the conditions of communication, democratizing the nature of 
demand-making in civil society.   We refer to the connection of those meetings to the 
centers of decision-making as the empowerment dimension.   To put it bluntly, in the 
global translations of Participatory Budgeting, the communicative dimension has 
traveled, but not the empowerment one.  Defined in this way, there is the danger that 
Participatory Budgeting to be only peripherally connected to centers of power, and 
instead be linked to small discretionary budgets and bound by external technical criteria.  
It becomes a process of one-sided democratization that brings greater transparency and 
social justice up to the point where demands are delivered to state officials; what 
happens after that point, let alone what portions of city budgets are turned over to the 
popular mandate, are left untouched.  We worry about this reduction of the process and 
discuss ways to recapture the empowerment dimension, and ultimately, PB’s 
emancipatory potential. 
 
To be clear, the argument we advance in this essay should be read of as distinct from the 
blanket condemnations of participation that have become increasingly commonplace, 
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but is also distinct from a more traditional “de-radicalization” or cooptation argument.  
A cursory reading of the travels of Participatory Budgeting story might lead to an 
argument that under the rule of a leftist social-movement party Participatory Budgeting 
was a progressive experiment, while under other banners it has not been.  Our argument 
is different, and much more specific:  it was the combination of the communicative and 
empowerment dimensions that made the participation so consequential and 
transformatory.  That it happened under a particular political context is important to 
understanding how it came about, but incidental to our main argument.  We are 
agnostic, and here frankly less directly concerned with the particular composition of 
forces that could come to bring about such an institutional architecture in other places.  
Certainly it is hard to imagine it,  absent a political project and mobilization from 
below, but our goal is not to map in advance the contours of such a project.   What we 
are more concerned with here is developing a more precise set of analytic tools to 
discern different aspects of participatory budgeting, and by extension, other Real 
Utopian proposals.  The set of critical tools we propose should allow us to question 
participatory proposals by both political actors who have our sympathies and those who 
do not. 
 
Our essay proceeds in parts.  First, we briefly describe Participatory Budgeting in both 
its communicative and empowerment dimensions, and its take-up by the Real Utopias 
discussion.   We then discuss the global travel of a PB defined solely as a toolkit of 
communicative reforms and the pitfalls such a reduced model.  We then argue for the 
value of a more complex architecture that articulates PB procedures with decision-
making, before concluding with specific suggestions to recapture the emancipatory 
dimensions of participation.  
 
Participatory Budgeting as a Real Utopia 
Participatory Budgeting is at its heart a relatively simple idea: citizens deciding over the 
priorities and projects that make up a public budget.  The “Brazilian version” that was 
implemented in Workers’ Party administrations throughout the 1990s and early 2000s 
was in dialogue with a “basic blueprint” of PB that had been circulating among PT 
networks and provided the starting point for most of the PB experiments that took place 
at the time in Brazil.
8
  This was essentially closely modeled on the famous “Porto 
Alegre model,” which was in place in that city from 1991 until 2004.  This blueprint 
had two components: an yearly cycle of assemblies where participants choose and 
debate projects, and a reshuffling of the  
Participatory Budgeting has been part of the Real Utopias cannon since the 2003 
volume
9
, and Real Utopian thinkers have returned to it time and again for inspiration.
10
  
It connected, specifically, with the discussion on Empowered Participatory Governance 
(EPG).   As is well-known, the Empowered Participatory Governance proposal is an 
ideal-typical institutional design proposal for deliberative decision-making and 
pragmatic problem-solving among participants over a specific common good.  It is, in 
principle applicable to a wide-range of situations. It is understood to center on reforms 
that devolve decision-making to local units that are supported, but not directed, by a 
central body. These units are in turn truly empowered to enact their decisions. This 
model aims to foster redistributive and efficient decision-making that is deliberative and 
democratic and superior to command-and-control structures on a number of counts. 
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The Porto Alegre experiment, which was the case study cited in the volume, met the 
criteria of the Empowered Participatory Governance proposal in a number of interesting 
ways. First, the process created direct deliberation between citizens at the local level 
and devolved substantial amount of decision-making power to these local settings. 
These citizens were involved in pragmatic problem-solving, and monitoring and 
implementing solutions achieved.  These continuously deliberative processes unfolded 
over the years, meaning that there were chances for participants to learn from mistakes 
and extend their own time-horizons of what an acceptable outcome might be. These 
local units, though vested with substantial decision-making power did not function 
completely autonomously from other units or from central monitoring units.  Rather, 
central agencies offered supervision and support of local units but respect their decision 
making-power, the feature of recombinance.  The Porto Alegre case also showed how 
complex management of a whole city could occur through combinations of direct and 
representative democratic forms.  
 
Disaggregating Communicative and Empowerment Dimensions  
The Real Utopias discussion of PB, like most other accounts of the time, tended to 
emphasize the process of decision-making within PB over the processes that linked 
those decisions to government actions.  There are nuanced distinctions between 
bargaining and problem-solving within forums, and there are careful accounts of how 
truly inclusive participatory forums are.  There is much less on the sources of funding 
for PB, let alone distinctions between, say, decisions on operating and capital budgets.  
There is more on the coordination between neighborhood forums than on between 
municipal departments, or municipal departments and local planning agencies.   There 
are careful counts of the gender balance of speakers at forums but no counts of how 
often popular decisions were countermanded by technical criteria.   The research of the 
time tended to be participant-centered, and viewed the process very much as 
participants might: a lot of detailed attention to one’s neighbors and proximate others 
like facilitators, with the government machinery, more elusive and fading into the 
background. 
11
     
Today, with the benefit of hindsight, however, it is easier to return to the model to re-
read it in a more complex way, attentive to both participant-side and institutional 
perspectives.   It is also a more pressing task.  On one hand, the proliferation of PB 
projects call for some kind of more nuanced analytics beyond analyzing rules at 
meetings and counting participants.  The case of the city of Porto Alegre itself is 
especially instructive.  There, after the defeat of the Workers’ Party in late 2004, a 
politically conservative coalition maintained the surface features of PB while returning 
the actual functioning of the administration to more traditional modes of favor-trading 
and the favoring of local elites.    On the other, the romanticized identification with the 
architects of the process that formed the political backdrop for many of the analysis is 
also no longer sustainable.  Leaving aside the corruption allegations about the Workers’ 
Party that have surfaced, a number of careful research projects on the numerous 
participatory forums established by the national PT administration in Brazil (2002-
present) have shown that the veneer of radical democracy can co-exist with quite 
conservative policies.
12
   One of the lessons for critical scholars is probably that 
agnosticism, rather than what anthropologists call “ontological complicity,” might be a 
better stance from which to evaluate participatory processes.  
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From the point of view of the community activists who first conceived of Participatory 
Budgeting, it is possible to analytically separate into features that have to do with 
conditions of communication, and those that have to do with empowerment.  
Nonetheless, we do so, on the basis of the version that was implemented by Workers’ 
Party administrations throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.  This was in dialogue with 
a “basic blueprint” of PB that had been circulating among PT networks and provided 
the starting point for most of the PB experiments that took place at the time in Brazil.
13
 
This is essentially closely modelled on the famous “Porto Alegre model,” which was in 
place in that city from 1991 until 2004.   
The Communicative Dimension of Participatory Budgeting 
The democratic discussion on urban infrastructure projects are the feature of  
Participatory Budgets that best known.  Designed to match the municipal budgeting 
cycle, processes were organized around a schedule of government-sponsored meetings 
that begun early in the year – around March or April, ending in November.   All 
processes begun with assemblies, or open meetings, throughout the town or city, ending 
when a series of selected projects is forwarded for inclusion in the yearly budget.  It is 
in these assemblies that most of the democratic discussion and deliberation takes place, 
and throughout the year assemblies have different purposes: early on they serve the 
purpose of informing participants about the process and about available resources; later, 
particular projects are proposed and debated, and representatives are chosen.  The last 
assemblies are devoted to making the final decisions on the budget.   Typically, PB 
processes drew large numbers of participants, with in some recorded cases, as much as 
10% of the total population of a town coming to meeting at some point. 
Much of the scholarship on Porto Alegre and on Brazil has alluded to PB Meetings as a 
public sphere.  Indeed, self-rule in PB is conceived of as a deliberative process
14
, closer 
to Habermas's theory than accounts of direct democracy or theories of radical 
democracy.
15
    But there are significant differences. For Habermas, as is well-known, 
political self-rule takes place in two stages: first, a casual discussion outside institutions 
(in the “life-world”), and then a formalization of this debate in a public opinion that 
would influence the institutional actions.  The key link for Habermas are social 
movements, which have the power to amplify demands in the public space.  Porto 
Alegre’s Participatory Budget changed this scheme within a characteristically 
deliberative framework.  What for Habermas and others was a natural sequence of 
informal discussion-social movements-political system gave way to formal discussions 
bounded by procedures and a direct influence on policy.    
The participatory budget proposal took the thinking behind the deliberative turn into a 
participatory institutional framework.   The principal difference has to do with the link 
between public discussion and government.  In a purely Habermassian sense, the 
influence of citizens on government is highly contingent on their ability to frame a 
problem and mobilize allies, and the separation between rulers and the ruled is wide.  
Participatory Budgeting, instead, aimed to rationally translate bottom-up demands and 
structure the nature of those communications according to procedures.  Through 
participatory budgeting it is the administration that organizes public spaces ruled by 
deliberative frameworks.  
In any case, Habermas offers a counterfactual standard against which we can evaluate 
the communicative dimension of participatory budgeting as a process of 
democratization of political will formation. For Habermas,  the formation of political 
 7 
will starts in a debate between individuals in public space, in the context of shared 
understandings of action-orientation.  These take place under specific conditions: 
inclusion (nobody can be excluded from participation in a discussion that interests 
them), the absence of coercion (anyone can take part in the argument and counter 
argument freely without being subject to domination by others) and openness (each 
participant can start and continue the discussion on any relevant topic, including on the 
procedures regulate the discussion). 
16
  
By moving this critical framework to participatory budgeting, this gives us several 
counter-factual standards against which we can judge specific experiences: 
1) What is the intensity of the participation? Who actually participates? Are 
there features of these participatory spaces that prevent them from being 
open to all?   
2) How inclusive is the deliberation? In addition to presence at assemblies, do 
all citizens "deliberate"?  Are there systematic biases about who speaks, and 
who decides? Is the technical language made accessible to all?  
3) How democratic is the deliberation? What is the quality of decisions 
emanating from the participatory process?  Do participants feel free to argue 
and whether they can open debate or discuss the rules governing 
discussions?
17
  
The scholarship on Participatory Budgeting, in the Brazilian cases as well as in 
subsequent ones, has addressed the communicative dimension quite carefully, and 
“participant surveys” continue to be a global mainstay of the research effort.    
The Empowerment Dimension of Participatory Budgeting 
Self-rule, however, does not rest only in communication, which leads us to the second 
component of Participatory Budgeting, the coupling of the assemblies with 
administrative structures.  We refer to this as the empowerment dimension.    For 
Habermas, as well as for much of civil society theory, the link between deliberation and 
public policy takes place through the mediation of political and social organizations.
18
   
Participatory Budgeting, in contrast, sets up an institutionalized link.   Relying on 
deliberative processes at the level of proposals (where they were valued for their 
reasonableness in non-coercive and egalitarian spaces), it coupled those proposals to 
government actions through real democratic reforms of the state apparatus.  As we 
describe below this was more than the political will to respond to popular demands, but 
included a thoroughgoing administrative re-organization.  These are three, less visible, 
institutional features of Participatory Budgeting, which call the (exclusive) conveyor 
belt, bureaucratic participatory reforms, and the forum of forums. 
First is what we call describe as the (exclusive) conveyor belt.  The conveyor belt image 
is meant to invoke the idea that there is a clear and transparent institutional link between 
popular will and government actions with a minimum of veto points or room for 
discretionary changes.  The “chain of popular sovereignty” was protected from the 
moment decisions were made to their implementation.  This, for example, included a 
yearly, easily accessible and understood “Book of Projects” that listed when projects 
were decided, how they were funded, and the timeline of their completion.  Any 
technical changes or amendments that appeared along the way were returned to 
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participants.   A new budget planning office was created that centralized management 
accounts and PB.  Administratively, it stood above municipal departments.  The idea 
was to “ring-fence” the capital budget from other sources of pressure.  As an 
administrative body above municipal departments, this was a way to ensure impartiality 
in implementation.
19
  And while budget was subject to approval by the municipal city 
council, the pressure and monitoring of large numbers of participants meant that it 
usually simply approved without modifications.  This conveyor belt was the exclusive 
point of contact between government and citizens.   All other channels for citizen 
demand-making other than the PB were essentially closed.  Contact with the 
administration on the part of the population was made almost exclusively through the 
PB.
20
    
Second, there were complex institutional arrangements to prepare the administrative 
machinery to accept these inputs, which we call the bureaucratic participatory reforms.  
In order for “participation to come into the administration” it was necessary to create 
new patterns and practices within the administration.  In addition to the direct, 
institutionalized links between participation and government action (which implied 
centralization), there was combined with a decentralization of the administrative 
machinery. 
21
  It was recognized that bureaucrats and offices were used to dealing with 
different sorts of inputs than those developed at neighborhood assemblies by the city’s 
poor residents.   All municipal departments were required to create positions of 
community facilitators.  Community facilitators were to be the “face” of each municipal 
department in each of the city’s districts, and required to attend PB meetings with the 
express purpose of helping participants prepare technically viable projects and to be 
accountable for the ongoing projects.  That is, they were responsible for serving as 
interface between community and technical experts within the departments.  All 
community facilitators attended a weekly forum to participatory processes coherent.  In 
as much as possible, “technical expertise was to be made subservient to the popular 
mandate, and not the other way around,” as one of the facilitators described it in an 
interview in 1999.    
Third, there was a higher tier of participatory structures that served an important “forum 
of forums” function.  This was the Municipal Council of the Budget – it  brought 
together representatives from various points of the process.  Its purpose was to debate 
and legitimate the process as a whole.  They dealt with unexpected events beyond the 
rules;  they deliberated  and decided on the rules of the process; they set broad 
investment priorities according to abstract social justice criteria; they acted as 
intermediaries between municipal government and local-level participants.  This forum 
of forums provided the ability of participants to self-regulate the process and to have a 
second order debate about these general principles which finally would shape 
administrative public policies. 
 
The Importance of The Empowerment Dimension 
This second set of reforms connected the deliberative forums with government actions.   
They included the creation of a direct and exclusive link between forums and decisions; 
a set of changes in the bureaucracy to be able to process those decisions; and a forum 
for second-order discussions about general principles.   This, in our view, was what 
made the deliberative forums on urban infrastructure, as novel as they were, into a 
transformative experiment that restructured social space.   In it, we can glimpse at 
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political self-rule and the utopia of a political project based on participation.   The EPG 
proposal itself, of course, distinguishes itself from some of the New Left Proposals of 
the 1960s with its insistence on empowerment as well as participation.    Cohen and 
Rogers, in commenting on the EPG proposals in the 2003 volume, warn that it is 
important not to forget “power” when speaking of Global North-based proposals, 
because  “they are as much about shifting the balance of power to create democratic 
conditions in the first place […] as they are about establishing specifically deliberative 
forms of democratic practice.” 22   
If Habermas is the theorist with whom we associate the communicative dimension of 
PB, we can find some inspiration in the political philosophy of Rawls for thinking about 
this empowerment.  Rawls is known for many contributions, but for the discussion here, 
his insights on the exercise of public reason are most relevant.   For Rawls, to invoke 
public reason involves justifying a particular position by way of reasons that people of 
different backgrounds could accept. Specifically, it means orienting and justifying 
government action on the basis of verifiable and debatable abstract criteria of social 
justice.
23
    
There are several interesting features of this empowered debate.  First, it was a debate in 
which all had to participate.  PB was the only connector between citizenry and local 
state and everybody, rich or poor, organized or unorganized had to debate their 
proposals within the new structured public sphere.  Second, deliberations were 
structured by principles of social justice.   The PB’s decisions were weighed and sorted 
by social justice principles decided on by participants. The mechanism and description 
of the criteria are available elsewhere.
24
  It solved the problem of arbitrariness in a 
democratic scenario, providing a public, revisable and deliberative reference to the 
reason-giving politics.   Further, the presence of this social justice proceduralism 
endowed participants with an instrument that did not depend solely on the good-will of 
elected representatives, and that diminished the degree of discretion of bureaucrats. But 
it also bridged the gap between citizen’s proposals at assemblies, always suspected of 
being biased by partial interests, and administrative outcomes that are demanded to fit 
with long run policies.  
The consequences of the combination of communicative and empowerment dimensions 
were significant.   First is that participants, through the Council of the Budget, were able 
to change the social justice criteria, as well as the rules of the process.  They were also 
able to influence how much of municipal resources were dedicated to the process. They 
were, in other words, able to change the terms of their participation in terms of its 
relationship to government.  The process provided a clear counterfactual against which 
the exercise of power could be evaluated, making the devolution into charismatic 
authority less likely.  But second, and perhaps more dramatically, it allowed to 
administration to carry out a pro-poor policy under a legitimated political framework.  
Applying social justice criteria, administration gave priority to proposals arising from 
the PB, distributing the budget among the different municipal areas and setting up the 
management of institutional policies.  PB thus offered a unique way to articulate 
participation and empowerment within modern political arrangements.  For former 
Mayor Raul Pont, PB was an alternative to the historic dilemmas faced by 
representative democracy: how to articulate power with participation and social 
justice.
25
   But in contrast to an earlier Latin American tradition on the Left, PB placed 
the political debate about emancipation and participation within representative 
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institutions. Only then it could be possible to create "the political and legitimacy to treat 
unequals unequally."
26
   
Thinking of the empowerment dimension invites us to ask not only of the deliberative 
intensity and quality, but also examine the intensity with which participants can qualify 
their preferences and sort them, as well as the intensity of the connection between 
participation and the exercise of authority.  The empowerment dimension has for us, 
four different, interrelated criteria against which to judge other PB experiments:  
1) The primacy of the participatory forums.  That is, if the participatory forums 
are not the exclusive point of contact between government and citizen, how 
important of a point of contact is it?  Are there other ways of accessing 
government resources, and how important are those? 
2) The scope and importance of budget issues that are subjected to 
participation.  How much of the local budget is subjected to participation, 
and how important is that budget to social justice? 
3) The degree of actual participatory power over the budget.  Are there 
institutionalized, direct, and transparent links between participation and 
government action?  What, if any, administrative reforms, are undertaken to 
prepare the staty apparatus to receive participatory inputs. What discretion 
do elected officials, technical staff, and bureaucrats have over the decisions 
once they are made? 
4) Participation’s self-regulating, or constitutional aspect.  To what extents 
are participants able to determine the rules of participation?  To what extent 
are they able to debate and determine social justice criteria that will order the 
process?  To what extent are participants able to determine the reach of 
participatory influence over government affairs?  
Much of the research on Participatory Budgeting, as we have argued, has tended to be 
less attentive to this second, empowerment, dimension.   Part of the reason is that the 
blueprint that has traveled only includes the arrangements for the first, communicative 
dimension.  
The Global Travel of an Isolated Device 
In the 2000s, the idea traveled much further than Brazil.  After implementation in 
Europe, and then the rest of Latin America, PB arrived in Africa, Asia, and North 
America. If the travel within Brazil had shown that Participatory Budgeting was 
successful, modifiable and not necessarily only good for redistribution, in this second 
stage the idea traveled as a success story of primarily ‘good governance,’ and one 
divorced from administrative reforms. The PT’s innovation, in separating it from any 
identification of participation with social movements and associating it with a 
transparent and efficient administration made it an attractive device.  The fact it seemed 
to work in different contexts also helped.  But it was the process of translation, which 
turned PB into an instrument separable from the empowerment dimension that propelled 
the transnational journey in which PB crossed national, cultural, and political 
boundaries. By the late 2000s there were consolidated networks promoting Participatory 
Budgeting in all continents.  
The numbers for the spread of PB are impressive. By 2005, there were roughly 200 PB 
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experiences outside of Brazil; by 2008, there were at least 500, and by 2010, the sum 
total of PB experiences is at least 1500.  These experiences are today concentrated in 
Latin America and southern Europe, with now a strong presence in Northern Europe, 
and a significant number of cases in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe.  North America 
has a half-dozen experiences at the time of this writing
27
.  
It has become commonplace for critical scholars to attack, in blanket fashion, 
participatory reforms that have become so fashionable as providing a friendly façade to 
neoliberal reforms while fostering a sense of responsibility on communities for 
problems beyond their control.  Scholars have challenged the admitedly “heroic claims” 
made on behalf of participatory approaches
28, while taking “participatory boosterism” to 
task for failing to address questions of power, inequality, and politics.
29
   As part of a 
new rationality of government that calls forward an entrepreneurial citizen, participation 
emphasizes some of the most important characteristics of that citizen: self-regulation, 
responsibility for own problems, and a non-conflictive partnerships with the state.
30
  
Because participation in government is seen as an alternative to conflictive mobilization 
and disruption, it is argued, it becomes part of a set of strategies that de-politicize 
conflicts and thus pave the way for ever-more aggressive neoliberal reforms of the state.  
Leal, who calls participation a “buzzword in the neo-liberal era,” argues that it is no 
“coincidence that participation appeared as a new battle horse for ofﬁcial development” 
just when the impacts of earlier shock treatments were being felt.
31
 
In our view, valuable as some of the specific critiques are, we do not find it useful to 
generalize from clearly hollow processes promoted by international agencies to all 
participatory institutions in all contexts as some authors do.  Specific PB processes need 
to be evaluated in their context.  We need to ask about the two dimensions we have 
alluded to earlier:  about the intensity and quality of communication, and the intensity 
and quality of empowerment.   International toolkits only include the communicative 
dimension, as we have argued elsewhere, and the empowerment dimension is entirely 
dependent on local implementation.  Because PB is, in this way, also generally defined 
as external to the state, rather than as part of it, the series of real democratic reforms and 
connectors between the communication and state actions tend to be “blackboxed.”  This 
does not mean, however, that the empowerment dimension is necessarily completely 
absent.   
There is by now some analysis of the changing models of Participatory Budgeting 
around the world, in addition to our own research on its transformation into a best 
practice.
32
   Experiences are quite diverse.  Generally speaking, in global terms, the 
yearly cycle of participation remains important, and the participatory assembly remains 
the centerpiece of the experience. In many cities the division of cities into districts is 
absent, often leading to a process organization based on a single assembly.   The 
communicative dimension appears to be a constant (or at least more present), but the 
empowerment dimension varies widely.  
The case of Europe is telling.  Today, participatory budgeting is carried out in Europe in 
almost 200 towns or cities in a dozen different countries (and with a prospect of growth 
in the context of countries such as England, Portugal, Poland, Germany and Sweden).  
These are held in both small and large towns or cities: from Figaró in Spain or Borbona 
in Italy (with 1000 inhabitants) to Cologne in Germany, with its one million inhabitants. 
Some experiences link the process of PB with concrete spaces of decision making open 
to inhabitants, others are only consultative, and the public meetings become places for 
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merely expressing complaints, needs and hopes within a mechanism of “selective 
listening” where the final decision on spending priorities stands in the hands of elected 
officials. The methods used are also very diverse: from the selection of participants by 
means of lottery (random selection), to the participation of only association or NGO 
representatives, or open and general participation (as in most cases).   Beyond this, it is 
not possible to identify common design principles behind European Participatory 
Budgets and differentiate them from other participatory mechanisms in Europe.
33
   
There are, however, some clear national patterns.   Most French and Portuguese 
experiences are aimed at “bringing citizens closer to government;” German examples 
are part of a more general modernization of the administrative machinery; some Spanish 
examples, above all those led by the conservative party, function on this principle.  The 
English cases have to do with forms of public administration directed towards 
“community development”, while the new Swedish experiences emerged in 2009 with 
the primary aim of reactivating social relations in the context of a welfare state 
threatened by severe cutbacks due to the economic crisis.   Using the criteria for 
empowerment we have laid out above (primacy, scope/importance, participatory power, 
and self-regulation), most of the European cases would tend to not do very well on the 
first two, but with more variation on the latter two.  In terms of primacy of the 
participatory forums, which would be whether the participatory forum is the only or the 
primary point for claims-making, in most cases PB would be just one connector 
between citizens and local state, not at all exhaust the set of communication between 
them. And, as with deliberative spaces, the formation of new political subjects speaking 
for the “whole” has often come into conflict with other protagonists and other channels. 
34
   In terms of scope/importance, which is the portion of the budget subject to the 
process and how important that portion is, a general feature of European cases is that 
these are small, discretionary budgets, and that urban infrastructure in itself does not 
have the valence that it did in Brazil.  That said, in terms of participatory power, there is 
some interesting variation, with some cases, as the Spanish ones, for example, having 
greater institutionalized power than the cases that are described as more “advisory.”  
Particularly in those cases where participation is larger and more public, there is 
something like a de facto participatory power.   And finally, there often is some power 
of self-regulation.  In many of the cases there are meetings with participants to decide 
on the rules of the process itself, usually at the outset.  This self-regulation does not 
extend over the empowerment dimensions themselves (ie. whether the PB extends over 
this or that part of the budget, or what role the technical staff of the administration will 
play), but it does afford an opportunity for an abstract discussion of the general 
principles at play.     
The reduction of Participatory Budgeting to its communicative dimension with limited 
elements of the participatory dimension to poses at least three dangers from the point of 
view of an emancipatory project.  First, participation can become disconnected from the 
decisions that matter most to communities
35
.  As we have mentioned before, there is a 
strong attraction for Participatory Budgeting to be implemented through the path of 
least resistance, and thus become connected to small and discretionary budgets.  This 
could imply community effort and organizing around issues that are less pressing from 
the point of view of social justice, or worse, have the agenda of movements be dictated 
by the administrative possibilities rather than more autonomous conversations about 
needs.
36
   A second possibility is that participation might come to be understood as a 
technical solution, rather than as a political method of emancipation, what scholars have 
sometimes termed the de-politicizing of participation.
37
   A third concern is that a high 
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degree of discretion over participation’s outcomes remains in the hands of others in this 
way; there is the possibility of hijacking to legitimate charismatic authority as well as 
the possibility of demobilizing of communities that invest time and energy into 
processes that become understood as shams.  Along these lines, some of the studies on 
the experiences have indeed shown the usual weak impact they have had on the 
dynamics of the municipalities, even when the experiences have been devised with an 
emancipatory rhetoric in mind
38
.   
But the main risk of this is to turn Participatory Budgeting into a simple process of 
revelation of individual preferences, adjusting PB to the routines and the goals set by 
the New Public Management framework. This process could include a democratization 
of the actors who are able to participate in public policies, but participation is divorced 
from questions of social justice.  One clear consequence of the transformation of PB 
into a best practice has been the marginalization of social justice principles that inspired 
the initiative in the first place. Its principal justification now has to do with good 
governance and the universal participation, which fits well with the neutral and 
technical language of PB.  PB, in this way, comes to be one of many tools available to 
make for good governance, and its expansion, in many cases has taken place as a 
primarily a solution to political disaffection, in which the involvement of citizens 
becomes an imperative.  ‘Good governance’, following Paul Wolfowitz, president of 
World Bank from 2005-2007, has come to signify those “things that enable a 
government to deliver services to its people efficiently,” made possible by “combination 
of transparent and accountable institutions, strong skills and competence, and a 
fundamental willingness to do the right thing” 39. From this perspective, PB becomes a 
good tool to promote greater accountability and give voice to citizens in public 
decisions, improving good governance from outside of the administrative machinery.  
Like many other tools for good governance, it is prized for its value-neutrality, its ease 
of implementation, and its ability to attract many different kinds of institutional 
stakeholders.  PB is called for when there is a deficit in good governance.  It is not 
surprising, then, that the PB, as a tool for good governance is sometimes also treated as 
redundant.  Anwar Shah, a World Bank expert on Participatory Budgeting argues that in 
a democratic setting, where there is the rule of law, the PB can be a costly repetition of 
institutions of representative democracy. He argues that, “if there is a democratic 
process, participation, if there is rule of law, then participatory budgeting is not needed”  
Only in absence of democratic participation, “then one has to have some sort of 
participatory process to hear the voices that have not been heard”40. Shah’s perspective 
is shared by many politicians in local governments elsewhere
41
. 
 Can PB be a Transformative Reform? 
To summarize our argument so far, we have shown that in a first version of 
Participatory Budgeting there were two important dimensions to its institutional design: 
a communicative, and an empowerment dimension.  The former has to do with open, 
transparent and egalitarian communication.   The latter has to do with the way that 
communicative inputs are actually linked to state structures through a second-order 
discussion on justice that allow participants to define the terms of their own 
participation. We specifically identified four dimensions of empowerment: primacy, 
scope/importance, participatory power, and self-regulation.  Together this is what made 
Participatory Budgeting such good fodder for Empowered Participatory Governance 
proposals, and Real Utopian thinking more generally.  The global travel of Participatory 
Budgeting, however, has been of an institutional blue-print based on only on 
 14 
communication.  Toolkits for global implementation often emphasize the yearly cycle 
of meetings, rules for open and transparent assemblies, and ways to run voting 
procedures on proposals.  They say little about reforms to pave the way to make those 
proposals compatible with administrative logics, let alone mechanisms that would allow 
participants to define the terms of participation, or how to make those the primary 
interfaces.  In the global take-up of Participatory Budgeting the communicative 
dimension is present but the empowerment dimension is more variable.  In other words, 
looking around the many global cases there is a commonality around the set of meetings 
to discuss investments, but these are embedded within diverse national and political 
contexts that dictate the overall priority and purpose of the Participatory Budget.  In its 
toolkit version, there is little about the empowerment dimension, and its take-up has 
more often been about good governance and citizen apathy than social justice or 
transformation and thus there has often been little success at implementing 
empowerment reforms.  As we have already expressed, our worry is that PB becomes in 
the end a participatory experience that leaves citizens think collectively about irrelevant 
issues from the standpoint of the administration of power, as it has so often been the 
case with traditional participatory devices.
42
   And to reiterate, the goal of the analytic 
tools we develop here is not to disparage existing experiences, but to provide clear 
counterfactual standards against which to measure them. 
Faced with these limits, Graham Smith
43
 invites us to think about participatory 
budgeting in relationship to past practices, rather than against alleged unfulfilled 
promises.  Participatory budgeting can certainly be an improvement on previous 
participatory practices by expanding the political subject, establishing and guiding 
deliberative procedures, and at least, letting citizens take a position on budget cuts. 
Sintomer in his global research on PB points out that this is one of the few common 
denominators that we could find among the experiences in the world
44
.   We ourselves 
have argued elsewhere that the democratization of civil society is important
45
, but we 
should not assume this is automatic, as other studies have shown disappointing 
outcomes
46
.  Recent research on the PB, for example, has analyzed its impact on civil 
society in Brazil
47
, China
48
, Africa
49
  or Europe
50
 with mixed results
51
.  The 
democratization of civil society does have important implications in the organization of 
public opinion by incorporating a democratic reference in its formation. The fact that 
the PB had promoted a reform of the relationship between administration and civil 
society in democratic terms is no small matter.   This is also not to say that cases are 
unchanging or that there are not ways for the empowerment dimension to be re-
introduced to the broader discussion.  
First, it is clear to us that one of the challenges for implementers and translators of PB is 
that there is a strong pressure for PB to be treated as an end in of itself.   One of the 
changes with the global travel of PB has been the creation of dedicated PB networks (of 
which both authors of this paper are a part) that have tended, over time, to become 
dissociated from other discussions of participatory democracy or from discussions about 
cities and social justice. Relatedly, instead of a broader political projects (of which PB 
was one part) PB has become a platform in of itself.  But the narrower and narrower 
discussion has less and less room for other concerns.  The expert presentation of PB as 
value-neutral may feel like a necessity in order to introduce it in certain contexts, but 
that can limit the grounds for opening up the discussion again to speak of empowerment 
reforms.  The line between that is drawn between expertise and advocacy may make it 
difficult for technical experts to make the claims on behalf of those more expansive 
moves.  It is important, in our view, then, for PB campaigns need to connect with other 
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movements that are, in different ways, pressuring towards empowerment and 
democratic control of the state.  The range of potential allies here is wide, but it is 
important to think creatively.    In the case of the United States, for example, living 
wage activists, anti-police violence campaigns, and anti big-box retail organizers may 
not seem like immediate allies from the narrow point of view of shared interest in 
infrastructure investments, but are all very much working on empowering reforms of the 
state.   Similarly, PB campaigns ought not to lose sight of desirable budgets to control, 
even if starting with possible budgets.  Without the connection between communication 
and empowerment, the most sensible path for PB is for it to be implemented through the 
path of least resistance: often budgets that will find least resistance from bureaucrats or 
the powerful.  In Europe, for example, PB processes have been over discretionary 
portions of budgets, usually urban infrastructure, not over larger portions that are 
destined to economic development, for example.  In many cases, it appears too 
complicated to start with those, but it is important not to forget them.     
But most importantly, in our view, is that PB processes need to look at the participants 
themselves for their utopian imaginings.  In actual processes, there are myriad ways in 
which participants themselves tend to outrun the limits imposed on them. In our own 
research, no one has been more aware of the limits of experiences than participants 
themselves, who have sometimes pushed for an expansion of institutional features into 
enduring and meaningful connections to state structures.  A common refrain in both 
European and US processes by social justice activists is like what one organizer relayed 
to us in the context of the process in Chicago: 
I don’t care about the money.  One million dollars is nothing to us, and it’s a 
small drop of the city budget.  And we can’t really say we’ve ever really cared 
about ‘menu money.’  We’re more interested in making sure we get the funding 
that we need for the projects that we care about for our constituents. 
When asked why she was involved in the process at all, she went on to say, 
We see it [the PB] as an organizing tool.   It will help our members learn more 
about the city budget and then we can press the alderman about other things he 
controls, and we can move on to tackle the city budget. 
We raise, as a final thought, the issue then of whether PB can provide opportunities for 
citizens to go beyond its limits.  PB is as a platform for learning.  Political institutions 
are opened, in part, to a direct involvement of citizens, with tools and methodologies to 
facilitate this. Individual citizens finally come find an open space to express their needs 
and interests in connection with other citizens. Much of the time, though, as we have 
argued, though, this has happened in processes of low profile within administrations and 
decoupled from political projects or broader reforms.  Perhaps this is the reasonable 
limit for a starting point in the current context, but this is not the limit of what 
participation can come to be.    The logic of a participatory experience anchored in a 
direct process of decision-making can come to collide with institutional structures set 
up for something else.  As the boundaries between “state” and “society” are not always 
self-evident, the question of where the citizen mandate ends and where expert 
prerogative begins with participatory decision-making, for example, can become a 
source of tension and potential point from which to push the boundaries of the process 
itself toward one in which participants decide on its terms and transform the horizons of 
actually existing states.  The question for implementers and sympathetic scholars alike 
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is whether we have the ability to tap into the critical energy in ways that help expand the 
realm of the possible. 
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